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xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is,
his power (III. vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself, it is not by
virtue of his understanding himself, but (III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we
assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself,
by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we
conceive that a man understands himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because his power of activity is aided.
Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise
from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion. Q.E.D.
PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is
doubly wretched or infirm.
Proof. The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one. The second part is proved from the
mere definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions, xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be
overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.
Note. As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, namely, Humility and
Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in
that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from
nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union? The
crowd plays the tyrant, when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who consulted the
good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those
who are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of
reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.
PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.
Proof. This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and xxix.
PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
Proof. The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation (IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV.
xxiv.). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, and consequently
of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely, to act under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that
acts under the guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.). Therefore he who is in
extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue in other words
(IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
Q.E.D.
Corollary. Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the dejected specially fall a prey to the
emotions.
Note. Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and
the former a painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV. xviii.).
DEFINITIONS. 21
 ETHICS PART IV. OF HUMAN BONDAGE OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the
high-minded.
Proof. Pride is pleasure arising from a man's overestimation of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
vi.); this estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III. xiii. note); he
will therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is too well known to need
definition here), and will avoid the company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts.
Q.E.D.
Note. It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a
prey to all the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in
silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and, therefore,
pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider
himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of pride, may be
defined as pain arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]