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used by our country s industries!
of war against the USSR which the Allies might possess;
Attaching herewith a draft for a USSR Supreme
to learn any secret goals and plans of the Allies related to
Soviet Presidium decree, we request that the most distin-
the war; to find out when exactly the Allies are going to
guished employees of the 1st (intelligence) directorate,
open the second front in Europe; to obtain information on
NKVD/NKGB, USSR, mostly those who have served and
the newest secret military equipment designed and
do serve abroad, be decorated with orders of the Soviet
produced in the USA, England and Canada. According to
Union.
the instruction received by the FCD rezident in the United
Appendix: according to attached text.
States, Stalin had also requested any information related to
the Allies secret plans on postwar global settlement. 12
November 4, 1944 L.P. Beria
The broader spectrum of tasks facing Soviet intelli-
No. 1186 People s Commissar
gence in the US required additional personnel, both Soviet
Of Interior, USSR
and local. The pre-war staff of the NKGB and GRU
1st copy V.N. Merkulov
rezidenturas was rather modest. For example, in the New
People s Commissar of State Security, USSR
York consulate and in Amtorg there were only 13 intelli-
gence officers, most of them well known to the FBI.13
Unfortunately, the appendix mentioned above the so
Also, because the USSR and the US had become wartime
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 221
allies, both branches of Soviet intelligence had to limit extensive industrial espionage operation tied to a certain
their usage of the clandestine structures of the American Armand Feldman.24 He also laid the foundation for a
Communist Party (CPUSA).14 The usage of local network later used by Moscow Center to penetrate the
Communists was also limited by two other reasons: many American nuclear program by recruiting a number of its
of them were well known to the FBI, while many others important agents, including Harry Gold, who was ap-
were drafted after Pearl Harbor by the US Army and proached in 1935 through Thomas L. Black and in the late
Navy15 or interned, as had happened to a number of 1940s became a key member of the Klaus Fuchs-David
CPUSA members of Japanese extraction on the West Greenglass spy ring.25 Ovakimyan was caught red-
Coast.16 handed by the FBI in April 1941 while contacting one of
The lack of trained personnel in 1941 and early 1942 his agents who, according to the memoirs of another FCD
was soon supplemented by the growing flow of Soviet officer, Aleksandr S. Feklisov, was a plant.26 In July,
military and civilian specialists coming to the United Ovakimyan was exchanged for a number of Americans
States to work in the Soviet Purchasing Commission detained in Russia.27 He was replaced in the New York
(SPC) and other agencies that mushroomed after the USSR City rezidentura temporarily by his deputy Pavel P.
became a part of the Lend-Lease program. According to Pastel nyak and then by Vasilii Zarubin who headed both
Feklisov, by 1944 the staff of Amtorg and the SPC in New the NYC and Washington, DC branches of the NKGB
York City alone reached some 2,500, with an equal American networks until late 1944.28
number of officials, engineers and other specialists serving Several other names mentioned in the appendix
at the SPC branch in Washington, DC.17 The majority of should also be familiar: NKGB Major Stepan Z. Apresyan,
these people worked directly or indirectly either for the who in 1944 replaced Vasilii Zarubin as the Soviet rezident
GRU or NKVD.18 Also, the limitations imposed on the in Washington, and Major Leonid R. Kvasnikov, deputy
usage of the CPUSA membership did not mean that Soviet rezident in NYC and the chief of scientific and technical
intelligence ceased recruiting both Americans and non- intelligence in the United States. Captain Semion M.
Americans in America.19 And though the actual number Semenov is there, the other Amtorg official who played
of agents and informers recruited by Soviet intelligence an important part in sci/tech intelligence and later, in 1944-
officers in the United States will probably never be known, 1947, played a crucial role in Soviet atomic espionage in
according to British estimates, out of 1,200 cryptonyms the United States. Lieut. Col. Grigory G. Dolbin is also
that littered the traffic of the New York/Moscow and listed, since 1946 the NKGB (MGB) rezident in Washing-
Washington/Moscow channels of the FCD and GRU ton, DC. Among the younger generation of FCD officers
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